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Abstract
The success of applications for sharing GPS trajectories raises serious privacy concerns, in particular
about users’ home addresses. In this paper we show that a Bayesian approach is natural and effective
for a rigorous analysis of home-identification attacks and their countermeasures, in terms of privacy. We
focus on a family of countermeasures named “privacy-region strategies”, consisting in publishing each
trajectory from the first exit to the last entrance from/into a privacy region. Their performance is studied
through simulations on Brownian motions.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays GPS trajectories are not only easily recorded but also massively shared, for example via sport
social networks. This raises serious privacy concerns, because from complete GPS trajectories it is possible
to infer sensitive information about users, such as their home addresses (Liao et al., 2006; Hoh et al., 2006).
The problem can be tackled from two sides: on one hand, users should carefully select who can access
their trajectories; on the other, the amount of sensitive information contained in GPS trajectories should
be limited. Since users’ privacy awareness has been shown to be unreliable (Krumm, 2009), the second
approach is necessary, and can be implemented via algorithms taking GPS trajectories as input and giving as
output modified trajectories from which it is harder to infer sensitive information. We call these algorithms
obfuscation strategies, but they are also known as location-privacy protection mechanisms (Shokri et al.,
2011) or trajectory privacy preservation mechanisms (Singh et al., 2018). Obfuscation strategies range
from publishing nothing to publishing original trajectories as they are. Both extremes are undesirable in
opposite ways that highlight the tradeoff between privacy and utility, which is the residual value of the
obfuscated data for the considered application (Singh et al., 2018). Publishing nothing guarantees perfect
privacy but null utility, while full disclosure provides maximum utility but usually insufficient privacy.
In the present work, we focus on obfuscation strategies against home-identification attacks, in which an
adversary tries to localize the house of a user exploiting his GPS trajectories. Krumm (2007) and Hoh et al.
(2006) deal with the same type of attack but rely on heuristics giving as output, respectively, a single address
and a list of addresses with no ordering in probability, thus failing to quantify the adversary’s uncertainty,
which instead we regard as a key part of a privacy measure. To overcome this issue, we propose a Bayesian
framework for assessing the efficacy of privacy attacks and their countermeasures. Even if implemented
for home-identification attacks on GPS trajectories, our framework can be used for other types of data and
privacy attacks. A Bayesian approach is not completely new in privacy literature, but still mostly used
to formulate privacy definitions (Machanavajjhala et al., 2009; Bassily et al., 2013; Kasiviswanathan and
Smith, 2014). A partial exception can be found in Shokri et al. (2011), who however employ posterior bias
as a privacy measure, completely disregarding the uncertainty quantification that naturally comes with a
Bayesian approach.
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2 Framework for Home-Identification Attacks
We model home-identification attacks on GPS trajectories as Bayesian inference problems in which the
parameter of interest is the user’s house location θ ∈ Θ ⊆ R2 and data consist of n published GPS tra-
jectories y(i) = {y(i)t }t∈[0,T˜ (i)] (i = 1, . . . , n), possibly altered before publication. We assume that the
adversary has no access to the corresponding original trajectories x(i) = {x(i)t }t∈[0,T (i)] (i = 1, . . . , n),
but knows the adopted obfuscation strategy and has some background knowledge about the user’s house
location θ, modeled by a prior distribution pi. Under obfuscation strategy s and model m for the original
trajectories, the published trajectories are then described by the hierarchical model
(y(i) | x(i), θ) ∼ ps, (x(i) | θ) ∼ pm, θ ∼ pi (i = 1, . . . , n).
We model both original and published GPS trajectories with continuous time stochastic processes even if
GPS sensors actually record the position at discrete times, because the sampling frequency is usually high
(a typical value is 1 Hz).
2.1 Privacy and Utility Measures
Since we model privacy attacks as point estimation problems, it is natural to measure privacy through the
quality of the adversary’s estimate: the better the estimate, the poorer the privacy. This principle holds
for any privacy attack, while the type of sensitive attribute determines the loss function used to evaluate
the estimate. Since in our case the sensitive attribute is the user’s house location θ ∈ Θ ⊆ R2, we
adopt a quadratic loss function. We then employ the posterior Mean Square Error (MSE) as a measure
of the quality of the adversary’s estimate, and hence as a measure of privacy. Through its well-known
bias-variance decomposition, MSE incorporates both correctness and uncertainty, which are discussed as
privacy measures in Shokri et al. (2011).
While the privacy measure depends on the sensitive attribute, the utility measure depends on the con-
sidered application. In the present work we focus on sharing GPS trajectories of fitness activities via sport
social networks. In this context, fake times or locations are not allowed, since they would alter rankings.
The only admitted form of perturbation is cutting part of the original trajectories. In particular, users may
accept cuts to the initial and final part of their trajectories, which usually consist of how they get out of
their neighborhood and back in. However, we assume that users want these cuts to be as small as possible.
Based on these assumptions, the utility of a published trajectory y = {yt}t∈[0,T˜ ] with respect to the cor-
responding original trajectory x = {xt}t∈[0,T ] can be defined as a monotone-decreasing function φ of the
following squared perturbation (SP):
SP (y, x) =
{ ‖y0 − x0‖2 + ‖yT˜ − xT ‖2 if y = x∣∣[t1,t2], with 0 ≤ t1 ≤ t2 ≤ T
∞ otherwise (1)
where x∣∣[t1,t2] denotes the restriction of x to [t1, t2] and ‖ · ‖ the Euclidean norm in R2. If the published
trajectory is obtained by cutting the initial and/or final part of the original one, the SP is the sum of the
square Euclidean distances between their starting and ending points, otherwise it is set to infinity, leading
to the lowest possible utility.
The variability of original trajectories and the stochasticity of obfuscation strategies make the SP ran-
dom. We then define the utility of obfuscation strategy s, under model m for original trajectories and prior
pi on θ, as
Um,pi(s) =
∫
φ(SP (y, x)) dps(y | x, θ) dpm(x | θ) dpi(θ). (2)
In the present work, we do not need to quantify utility but just to set the same level of utility to fairly
compare two strategies, hence we do not need to specify φ. A sufficient condition for two strategies to have
the same utility, for any choice of φ, is to induce the same SP distribution.
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2.2 Privacy-Region Strategies
As stated in §2.1, the only obfuscation strategies that are admissible for fitness GPS trajectories are those
cutting at most the initial and final part of original trajectories. Since most of fitness activities either start
and finish close to the user’s house location θ or do not come close to it at all, this can be achieved by a
class of strategies, that we call privacy-region strategies, cutting the part of each original trajectory before
the first exit and after the last entrance from/into a privacy region containing θ. Each trajectory may be
cut using a different privacy region, hence we denote with Di the privacy region for the i-th trajectory. A
privacy-region strategy s is described by
(y(i) | x(i), Di) = x(i)∣∣[t(i)1 ,t(i)2 ], (Di | x(i), θ) ∼ ps (i = 1, . . . , n)
with t(i)1 = inf{t ∈ [0, T (i)] : x(i)t /∈ Di} and t(i)2 = sup{t ∈ [0, T (i)] : x(i)t /∈ Di}. If the infimum for
t
(i)
1 is over an empty set (i.e. the original trajectory never leaves the privacy region) then no trajectory is
published and the SP is set to infinity.
The distribution of each privacy region Di may depend on the corresponding original trajectory, allow-
ing to design adaptive obfuscation strategies. In this work, though, we do not implement this dependency,
leaving it to future research.
We now describe two privacy-region strategies, corresponding to different distributions of the privacy
regions: random-radius strategy and two-balls strategy.
In a random-radius strategy of parameters α > 0 and β > 0, the privacy regions are balls centered in
the user’s house location θ, with i.i.d. random radii ri such that r2i ∼ Gamma(α, β) (see Figure 1a).
Remark 2.1 Other choices for the distribution of ri are possible. The case ri ∼ δr∗ , with r∗ > 0 fixed,
leads to fixed-radius strategy. We will not analyze this strategy, even if used in industry, since an adversary
knowing r∗ can locate θ with no uncertainty based on just three distinct exit/entrance points from the
privacy region, which in this case is almost surely unique, leveraging elementary geometry.
In a two-balls strategy of parameters α > 0, β > 0, r > 0 and R > r, all the trajectories of the
same user are cut employing as a privacy region the same ball B(c,R), where the radius R is fixed while
the center c is randomly distributed within B(θ, r) as follows: c = θ + rρ[cos τ, sin τ ]T , τ ∼ U(0, 2pi),
ρ2 ∼ Beta(α, β) (see Figure 1b). This strategy generalizes the one proposed in (Krumm, 2007), where
c was uniformly distributed within B(θ, r), corresponding to α = β = 1. The restriction r < R ensures
that θ lies within the privacy ball. A value of r too close to zero, though, would almost reduce the two-
balls strategy to the fixed-radius strategy, that we have shown to be inefficient in Remark 2.1. Also ρ2
concentrated near zero would produce the same effect. On the other extreme, ρ2 concentrated near one
corresponds to c concentrated near ∂B(θ, r). In this case, if moreover r is close to R, we have that θ will
be close to the boundary of the privacy ball with high probability, producing exit points concentrated close
to θ. Hence, small values of r and distributions of ρ2 concentrated near zero or one should be avoided.
2.3 Privacy-Region Strategies on Brownian Motions
Our framework poses no limitation to the complexity of the model for the original trajectories, but we start
with one of the simplest possible models and assume that, given the user’s house location θ, the original
trajectories are independent Brownian motions starting at θ. Even if this is not a realistic model for human
movement, it can be useful to rule out candidate obfuscation strategies. In fact, if a strategy is unable to
hide the start of a Brownian motion, it cannot aim to hide the start of the much more structured human
movement.
Thanks to the memoryless property of the Brownian motion, we can consider a simplified version of
privacy-region strategies, consisting in cutting just the part of each original trajectory before the first exit
from the corresponding privacy region:
(y(i) | x(i), Di) = x(i)∣∣[t(i),+∞), (Di | θ) ∼ ps (i = 1, . . . , n),
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c
(b)
Figure 1: Random-radius strategy (a) and two-balls strategy (b) on the same original trajectory. The
unpublished part of the trajectory is plotted in grey, while the published part is in black. The privacy balls
have solid border: for the random-radius strategy the privacy ball is centered in θ, while for the two-balls
strategy it is centered in a random point c within the ball with dashed border.
with t(i) = inf{t ∈ R+ : x(i)t /∈ Di}. The squared perturbation (1) also simplifies to ‖y0 − x0‖2. The
exit time t(i) is a stopping time for {x(i)t }t∈R+ (Mo¨rters and Peres, 2010, Remark 2.14) and, if the privacy
region Di is almost surely a bounded domain containing θ, then t(i) is almost surely finite (Chung, 2013,
Chapter 4.3). Moreover, conditional on the exit point of the original trajectory from Di, the published
part of the trajectory is a Brownian motion independent of the unpublished part (Mo¨rters and Peres, 2010,
Theorem 2.16). It follows that the exit points of the original trajectories from the corresponding privacy
regions are sufficient statistics for θ. Given Di and θ, each exit point zi (i = 1, . . . , n) is distributed
according to the harmonic measure of parameter θ on the boundary of Di (Kakutani, 1944), a distribution
that we denote withHDiθ .
In conclusion, if the original trajectories are Brownian motions starting at θ, home-identification attacks
against privacy-region strategies can be represented as Bayesian inference problems with the following
hierarchical structure:
(zi | Di, θ) ∼ HDiθ , (Di | θ) ∼ ps, θ ∼ pi (i = 1, . . . , n).
3 Simulation Studies
We consider illustrative simulations on Brownian motions to understand which strategy among random-
radius and two-balls guarantees higher privacy. The comparison is fair only if the two strategies have
the same utility (Singh et al., 2018). Under our utility definition (2), a sufficient condition for this is
having the same SP distribution. We relax this condition and constrain just the first two SP moments
to be the same. Such moments are explicitly available only for the random-radius strategy, for which
SP ∼ Gamma(α, β). Hence, we fix the two-balls parameters first, then set the random-radius ones so
that the first two theoretical SP moments of the random-radius strategy match the first two sample SP
moments of the two-balls strategy.
We consider different sets of two-balls parameters, listed in Table 1. For each setting, we generate
50 Brownian motion trajectories starting at θ, which is fixed at the origin since the considered strategies
are translation invariant. We then process these trajectories through both strategies, producing 50 cut
trajectories each, on which we perform Bayesian inference for θ, under a uniform improper prior, using
PyStan (Stan Development Team, 2017). From the posterior samples of θ we compute a Monte Carlo
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TB parameters MSE median
r R α β mean SP TB RR
1 3 4 4 8.34 0.25 0.03
1 4 4 4 15.34 0.48 0.04
2 5 4 4 23.23 0.69 0.13
1 5 4 2 24.29 0.69 0.05
1 5 4 4 24.42 0.78 0.04
1 5 2 4 24.71 0.77 0.02
Table 1: Settings considered for the comparison be-
tween the two-balls strategy (TB) and the random-
radius strategy (RR).
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Figure 2: Posterior MSE given 50 trajectories for
the settings in Table 1. The median is plotted solid,
while 5% and 95% quantiles are dashed.
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Figure 3: Two-balls strategy vs. random-radius strategy as sample size grows, for a single set of two-balls
parameters (r = 1, R = 3, α = β = 4). On the left, the SP pdf; on the right, the posterior MSE median
(solid) and its 5% and 95% quantiles (dashed) as functions of the sample size n.
estimate of the posterior MSE, plotted in Figure 2 for all settings in Table 1. We can observe that the MSE,
which is our measure of privacy, is higher with the two-balls strategy than with the random-radius strategy,
in all settings. Especially with the two-balls strategy, higher SP (i.e. lower utility) corresponds to higher
MSE (i.e. higher privacy), in the expected privacy-utility tradeoff.
In Figure 3 we plot the posterior MSE as sample size grows, for a single setting (r = 1, R = 3,
α = β = 4). The MSE goes to zero under both strategies, but is stably higher with the two-balls strategy
than with the random-radius strategy. We can also observe that matching the first two SP moments produces
SP densities that are similar in shape as well, making the comparison particularly fair.
Finally note that each home-identification attack on 50 trajectories took about one second on a regular
laptop (Intel Core i7-3632QM CPU @ 2.20GHz x 8, 7.7 GB of RAM), with running time scaling linearly
in the number of trajectories. The modest amount of time and computational resources needed for the
attack confirms that risks for users’ privacy are real.
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4 Discussion
Further analysis of privacy-region strategies may involve the development of more realistic models for
GPS trajectories, which can still be plugged in our framework. This may lead to the loss of some of the
properties exploited here, as the sufficiency of exit points or the availability of their likelihood. Anyway, as
long as a generative model and some quasi-sufficient statistics are available, Bayesian inference can still be
carried out through Approximate Bayesian Computation (Beaumont et al., 2002). Exit points, which are
sufficient statistics in the Brownian motion case, are the first candidates as quasi-sufficient statistics under
more general models.
Other possible extensions of the present work are represented by different applications, obfuscation
strategies or even data-types. In fact, the utility measure is the only application-specific element in our
framework, which in all the other aspects is completely general.
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